





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

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LORD BROUGHAM'S

S P E E C H

UPON

THE ASHBURTON TREATY,

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS

ON FRIDAY, 7<sup>TH</sup> APRIL, 1843.

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LONDON:  
JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY.

1843.

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## TREATY OF WASHINGTON.

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THE order of the day having been read, for considering a resolution approving of the manner in which the recent Treaty of Washington was negotiated, and expressive of entire satisfaction with the terms on which it was concluded,—

LORD BROUGHAM rose and said,—My Lords, when I consider the very great importance of the question, in all its relations, both foreign and domestic, which I have undertaken to bring before the House this evening, and when I reflect on the load of responsibility which must appear to rest on me in performing, or attempting to perform, this undertaking, I certainly do not deny, that though I have had a very large and long experience in addressing various public assemblies, in dealing with subjects of various kinds and under every aspect of public affairs, I feel considerable uneasiness and even anxiety at the present moment. It may be thought to savour of presumption in an individual, apart from the Government, voluntarily to grapple with a question of such mighty interest; nevertheless there are some considerations which, while they have urged



me to the enterprise, seem to have a force sufficient to support me in proceeding with it. It is not now for the first time, my Lords, that I have had to deal with most important matters, concerning the relations of this country and the United States. None of your Lordships have had, for so long a period as I have had, the fortune to take an active part in endeavouring to allay animosities, and to restore peaceful and amicable relations between this country and America. Not only in 1808, when the ill-devised orders in Council were issued; but in 1812, when I was aided by my Noble Friend, whose negotiation forms the object of the present motion, and whose conduct upon that occasion pointed him out prominently as the proper person to proceed to America, for the purpose of putting an end to all matters in difference, and of restoring those feelings of friendship and mutual confidence that are of such vital importance to the welfare of the two countries—in 1812 I grappled for the second time with this question, and I had, with his powerful aid, the good fortune to triumph over that vicious policy which fettered the freedom of commercial dealings, embittered all intercourse with our American kinsmen, and sapped the whole commercial prosperity of the Empire. But what sustains and repairs me in performing this arduous duty is the absolute confidence I feel in the impregnable position which I now occupy. I rely on its

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strength upon all points; not merely those on which no attempt has ever been made to assail it, but I should even say still more with reference to those on which attacks have been made, and been triumphantly repulsed.

I shall now at once proceed to the subject-matter of this "great argument;" and if I shall succeed in "rising to the height of it," I feel confident that my labour and my anxiety will be rewarded by being the feeble, the humble instrument, of rendering a service to the cause of truth, of peace, and of my country.

When either the policy of a state, or the conduct of a family or of an individual, is canvassed, in any particular way, with reference to blame or praise, the question usually is, what has been gained, or restored, or lost, or secured, in that particular transaction? But it is, I should say, first of all absolutely necessary that we form to ourselves a clear idea of what the object was which the parties had in view--what was the point of pursuit--what the matter sought to be obtained--before we can safely come to any decision. If we take not this course, we shall little know how to mete out the share of praise or of blame that the parties concerned ought to receive. I shall therefore at once consider what the object of our Government was in originating this great negotiation, and what specific purpose they had in view when they sent a Minister to America.

Now, I hold this to be the clear and undeniable truth,—that the one great object of pursuit, the one great purpose sought to be attained, that purpose, in comparison with which every other point is a mere grain of dust in the balance, was the restoration of friendly feeling and amicable intercourse between England and America. If we only cast our eyes back for half a century, if we only look to the beginning of the independence of the United States, we shall at once perceive of what paramount importance as well as difficulty, this reconciliation was to both countries. So soon as the disastrous struggle which stripped England of her finest colonies was brought to a close, it is in vain to deny that on both sides of the Atlantic much ill-feeling naturally prevailed. Those feelings were kept rankling in the bosoms of each party to the contest, and circumstances occurred to render them still more acute. The great loss which England had sustained made the recollections bitter on this side of the Atlantic, and the indignities to which our opponents were exposed by the cast and complexion of our prejudices, made the feeling equally sore on the other side, notwithstanding the signal triumph which had there been won. To this I may add, for it is now matter of history, and can give offence to no one, that there was something in the establishment, for the first time in modern ages, of a great democratic government, of a purely republican constitution, which had an inevitable tendency to beget soreness

of feeling on our side of the water. We, with all our monarchical principles—for I will not call them prejudices—we, with all our aristocratic feelings, for I will not call them superstitions—we, with all our natural abhorrence of the levelling system and a democratic form of government, were impatient of beholding a great and rising empire, founded by monarchical England's sons, a republic—a level republic—in the veins of whose members flowed the blood of aristocratic England. We saw those republican principles rooted and planted deep in the hearts and feelings of 3,000,000 of Englishmen—we saw them ruling, and conquering, and flourishing, without a king to govern, without a prelate to bless, without a noble to adorn them—we saw all this effected at the point of the sword, after a series of defeat, disaster, and disgrace to the British arms. No wonder, then, that all strong feelings and deeply-rooted prejudices were called into fierce action so often as the successes of America were remembered—so often as the name of the new republic was pronounced. Nor were words wanting to express those exasperated feelings. A tone was assumed, sometimes of bitterness—sometimes of affected superiority, far more offensive than the utmost bitterness—sometimes of aristocratic exultation over the humbler members of the American community—which, though it might be in some degree excused by the violence offered—and somewhat rudely offered—to long-

cherished prejudices, and was not the less calculated to wound and exasperate American bosoms, because it was diametrically opposed to those strong and powerful sentiments which they themselves cherished. They were as deeply impressed with the necessity of upholding the principle of plain and rustic equality as we were with the duty of maintaining the Corinthian capital of aristocratic rule. They upheld the massive but simple columns of their homely structure with as much fondness as we shewed for our own many beautiful pillars.

Events were not wanting to blow the coal of discord between the two countries.—Whilst various matters were tending to maintain exasperation between the two countries, a great event shook all Europe, and indeed all the world to its base. The French Revolution added, on the part of England, new fuel to the aristocratic and monarchical feeling which was so dearly cherished in this country, imparting at the same time new exultation and additional triumph to republican America. When things were in this state—when the feelings on either side were highly exacerbated—the French intriguer, the Jacobin leveler, the propagandist of republic opinions and principles, stepped in, and increased the discord. France, not satisfied with the dead level of American institutions—not content with the pure and absolute democracy of republican America—could not be grateful unless America, republican like her-

self, democratic like herself, should raise her arm against all the institutions of the old world, partake of that anarchy which prevailed within herself, and join in the war to which it had given birth. French intrigue laboured hard to introduce that confusion into America which had already laid waste all France, and which had kindled the war with England. Hence, for the last three years of the presidentship of that great man who then governed America, the greatest man, I will venture to say, that, as a ruler, either the old or the new world has produced, he endeavoured to hold the balance evenly between the factions in his country, and to maintain the republican principle untainted by that anarchy which mischievous or misguided men would introduce into the State founded by his sword, guided by his wisdom, and sustained by his patriotism. He successfully resisted the intrigues of France, and succeeded in preserving the great blessing of peace which he had achieved, when he nobly conquered the independence of his native land. During those three momentous years we were fated to see one perpetual contention between England and America, in the course of which, at every turn of the negotiation, war was ready to burst forth. Next came the neutral questions; then the short peace or truce with France—the peace of Amiens. Then followed, in rapid succession, the new neutral controversy, the Orders in Council, and the question of impressment, until we were ulti-

mately involved in actual war. So that since the peace of Versailles, which acknowledged the independence of the United States, from those feelings and prejudices which I have described, owing to the events at which I have shortly glanced, and in consequence of the practices of French intriguers, it has so happened that points of difference having revived the half-forgotten hostilities of 1812 and 1813, we have been in a state of perpetual soreness, irritation, and heart-burning. The interval was filled up by mutual injuries, mutual offences, mutual recriminations; suspicions and jealousies were ready, each moment, to break out on either side; mutual chagrin and vexation at each other's success—mutual joy and triumph at each other's disasters; then direct and downright animosities; then short-lived truce; then war—actual war; and at last peace—the name of peace rather than the reality or the substance of that prime, that inestimable blessing. One is reminded of the picture given in the Roman comedy of the relations between parties who should naturally know no coldness, no quarrels.

*Iajuriæ*

*Suspiciones, inimicitia, induciæ,*

*Bellum, pax rursus.*

But it was the aspect rather than the real, fair form of peace. It is in vain to doubt, what it is impossible to deny, that after peace was in name restored, matters continued almost entirely on the same footing

as before; so that, upon the accession to office of my noble friends opposite—I allude particularly to my noble friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs—they really may be said to have found matters with respect to England and the United States in anything but a satisfactory position, in everything but a warlike position, with some half dozen of the more difficult questions to settle—some three or four points upon which both nations had all but vowed never to listen to reason, and never to come to any understanding—and some other points, the settlement of which had often been attempted, and the attempt had as often failed. One question, at least, baffled all such attempts; a question which, with regard to the importance of the interests involved, with respect to the strong feeling entertained on the subject on both sides of the water, and, as to the difficulties which surrounded it, matched, I will venture to say, any other point of discussion on which negotiators ever had to treat, or which, when all attempts at treaty have failed, has brought on the last resort—the resort to the sword. Such, my Lords, was the state of things—such was the aspect of our foreign affairs as regarded America—such were the feelings and such the difficulties which prevailed, when my Noble Friend undertook the task—as important as it was hard—of effecting a complete adjustment of all these difficulties, and of reconciling the two nations once more.



I have said that matters were all but in a hostile position ; and the state of the case was this :—A train was laid in America, in the feelings of the people upon the Boundary Question ; on the subject of Canadian interference, with respect to the cases of the *Caroline* and the *Creole* ; above all, upon the question of the Slave trade and the Right of Search ; feelings of a similar kind prevailed in this country, though on the opposite side of the question, doubtless as strong and as universal. It was thus rendered inevitably certain that, if any mischance had happened to peace in Europe,—if any war, or anything like war, had broken out on this side the Atlantic,—one spark of that fire which would then have broken out in the old world, borne across the ocean, would have kindled the train thus ready laid to explode, extended the flame to America, and involved the new world as well as the old in endless war. And if I am asked whether there was any likelihood of that spark being flung off, I must refer—though I am loth to broach any matters but those immediately under discussion—to a man existing in France, who may be said to have been, and still to be, the impersonation of hostile feeling, the promoter of discord between America and England. I name him, because I wish to attach undivided blame to the quarter within which, as I hope, the guilt is, without any accomplice, confined. I name General Cass as the person, whose manœuvres, whose discredit-

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able conduct, whose breach of duty to his own Government,—more flagrant than his breach of duty to humanity, and as a descendant of free English parents,—whose conduct in these particulars it is wholly impossible either to pass over or to palliate. Even after the adjustment of the differences between the two countries, after an end had, all but miraculously, been put to the difficulties which beset us—that negotiator, that envoy sent to preserve peace—that man presiding at Paris over the pacific relations between France and America—that man sent to maintain general goodwill and amity—that minister of peace, acting as if some friend had whispered to him, and inspired him, *Disjice compositam pacem, sere crimina belli*—did his very best to destroy it, by the circulation of arguments upon questions of international law, of even the rudiments of which he had no more conception than he had of the languages spoken in the moon—he having, to all appearance, no more capacity of reasoning upon any question than he had of understanding legal points and legal differences—by stepping out of his own province, and mixing himself up with French affairs—with the negotiations between France and England—which he had no more to do with than he had with treaties between two Powers in the Peninsula of India—and by officiously obtruding upon the French Government his impertinent protest against the treaty between England and France, in order, if he could, to excite war between

the two countries. That was his object; and I speak with the greater confidence, because I have now before me the severe reprimand given him by his own principal, Mr. Webster, for his conduct during that negotiation, for his interference with matters which in nowise concerned him, and for his gratuitously thrusting his remonstrances upon his own Government, who had sent him out, whose servant he was, whose orders he was bound by his allegiance to obey, whose proceedings he had no shadow of vocation even to criticize, much less to blame. And for what did he do this? For the sake of furthering his electioneering interests in America—from a desire for the attainment of that situation, the possession of which he envied Mr. Tyler,—the situation of first magistrate of that great republic—he pandered to the mob-feeling of the lowest rabble in the United States. It is a circumstance which I contemplate with a pure and unmingled satisfaction, that the most respectable portion of the American community is favourable to the maintenance of peace with England, although the detestable spirit of faction prevents that desire from being entertained in every quarter. This vile working of party feeling prevents me from affirming that every respectable person in the Great Union is the friend of this country and of peace; but this I will say, and every one who is acquainted with the state of things in America will vouch for the truth of my

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assertion, that wheresoever in that country there is to be found a lower race of politicians than all others—wherever there can be discovered an inferior caste of statesmen—wheresoever in raking into the filth and the dross of faction, the dregs of political society, there is to be dug up a grovelling, groundling set of politicians,—that wherever the mere rabble holds sway, as contradistinguished from men of property, of information, and of principle,—in that quarter, among those groundling statesmen, among those rabble mobs, among that lowest class of the people, you are absolutely certain to find the strongest and most envenomed prejudices against the American alliance with England, and the greatest disposition to see war usurp the place of peace between the two kindred nations.

Such, my Lords, were the dangers, such were the risks, and such the difficulties by which my Noble Friend opposite, and my Noble Friend (Lord Ashburton), whose delicacy prevents him from attending in his place this evening, found their path beset at every step. To heal these divisions—to provide a real and substantial cure for the wounds which existed in each of the two countries—to effect, not merely the adjustment of the differences in detail, but, above all, to reconcile the two countries, and to restore that feeling of cordial good will which ought naturally to subsist between communities related by language, by laws,

by the same literature, and by a common descent, was the paramount object of my Noble Friend opposite, and of his emissary, my Lord Ashburton. Your Lordships will, I am sure, give me credit for not having been influenced in entering into these details by any desire of needlessly occupying your time by referring to these fruitful subjects of an easy declamation ; but it is quite impossible to tell what my case is, without calling your attention to the present, or, rather happily, the late position, and the state of feeling that prevailed, or had so long unhappily ruled, on both sides of the Atlantic.

But, because I hold the assuaging of these feelings to have been the grand object of our endeavours, do I say, that the terms agreed upon are of no moment at all, that they are but as dust in the balance, absolutely and of themselves and in every point of view, when I only say they are as a feather compared with far mightier objects ? Do I hold that it was quite immaterial what terms were consented to on one side or the other ? Very far from it. Some terms are always of importance. I should say that the pecuniary interests, the commercial interests of countries are, in questions of negotiation, of comparatively little importance, and for this reason : —If a war should take place, the expenses of the first six months of that war would cost incalculably more to both parties than the whole object in dispute. The case is similar to many law-suits, as

many of my Noble and Learned Friends know. Some of my Noble Friends have profited more or less by such suits, and other Noble Lords continue, without profiting much, to suffer a great deal from the laborious discharge of their duties in investigating such cases. I have very seldom seen a cause, in which a moderate amount, under 100*l.* or even 150*l.*, was involved, which, upon a calculation of profit and loss, it would not have been the most prudent course, if the man had a receipt in his pocket, to have given up rather than incur the expenses of costs—and then run the risk, and there is always some risk, as to the result. But a man knows that if he did this in one case he would be liable to be gradually, and indeed very speedily, stripped of every thing he possessed. Such is also the case of nations, with regard to their disputes and their great trials, wars. The cost is heavier than any mere loss or gain can be worth. But anything affecting the honour of a country is always of importance; and I think it was Mr. Fox who once wisely and profoundly observed, that while he could never approve a war for profit, a war for the maintenance of honour was a very different thing, for the sacrifice of national honour must lead to the downfall of the country. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the terms and conditions of the important Treaty to which I am now referring. This becomes doubly necessary when you are dealing with a people like our

Transatlantic brethren, who are somewhat prone, after the manner of democratic nations, to magnify themselves and undervalue others, and to count all they gain in any new state as a tribute rendered by fear to their greatness and their courage—I now undertake to shew your Lordships that every one object of the negotiation has been gained, as well as the reconcilment of the two nations—that no one interest of this country has been sacrificed—that nothing has been given up which it was of the slightest moment that England should retain ; and, above all, that no one principle has been sacrificed, and that the high and untarnished honour of the people, of the Crown, and of the constitution of this country has, throughout the negotiations of my Lord Ashburton, acting on the instructions of my Noble Friend opposite, been preserved absolutely unsullied and pure.

I therefore come, my Lords, and I will be as brief as possible, to those points which the negotiator had to handle. I will begin with the subject of the Caroline.—It has been said that an apologetical tone was adopted by my Noble Friend in dealing with this question ; but that he entirely succeeded in his negotiations on this point, that every difficulty was removed, that every doubt was at once abolished, and that the whole question was settled satisfactorily to all parties, I have yet to hear denied. This has certainly never been doubted on either side of the Atlantic. The greatest difficulty

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to be apprehended in the settlement of the differences between Canada and the United States arose, perhaps, from the fact of their near neighbourhood ; for near neighbourhood in the case of states, as in that of private persons, does not always engender great vehemence of affection ; but has sometimes a tendency, both with individuals and with communities, to beget feelings of a very different character. Accordingly monarchical and aristocratic Canada is very apt, if not to look down upon its neighbour the United States, yet to feel a pharisaical self-importance ; to bless God that it is not as other men are—deprived of the spiritual blessings of a church, destitute of the light of the royal countenance, possessing only the rude and clumsy Doric columns of a republic, instead of seeing the tendrils of their vine and the branches of their fig-tree twine round the graceful Corinthian shafts of an aristocratical structure. Such is the feeling which prevails among our fellow-subjects in Canada. They were the witnesses, and indeed the actors in the affair of the Caroline, and if any persons were likely to feel dissatisfaction with the negotiations on this subject, had anything gone wrong, had any undue concession been made, or had any needful stipulation been omitted, the people of Canada were they. I understand from some friends of mine who have lately visited that country,—one of them an Hon. and Learned



Gentleman who has lately appeared at our bar (Mr. Falconer) — for whose great abilities my Noble and Learned Friends will vouch, — for whose accuracy and intelligence, and total freedom from prejudice, I can vouch from personal knowledge, and who was in Canada when the result of the negotiations was promulgated,—that nothing could give more entire satisfaction to the people of the province than these negotiations and their results. The press also was almost unanimous in its praise of the manner in which the affair of the Caroline was concluded ; and, the press may be taken as an indication of the popular feeling, so far it is worthy of attention, though I am far, indeed, from holding it anything like a safe guide in other respects. It appears that out of eleven papers, of which the press of Canada is composed, no less than ten gave the most entire and express approval of all that had been done on the subject of the Caroline. But another testimony in favour of that negotiation I take from a very different source—from the eloquent silence on the subject of the objectors to my Noble Friend. Not one word has been said by them against that section of the Treaty which touches the taking of the Caroline. True, I may be expected to say—Oh, such candid objectors as they are must have too much British feeling, too much candour not to give their open and oral testimony in favour of that part of the Treaty. But no! Not only is there a dead silence with

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regard to blame, but there is a dead silence with regard to praise also—

Et quæ . . . .  
Desperat tractata nitescere posse, relinquit.

The objector, whenever he can find food for his spleen, battens upon it; when there is nothing that can turn to gall, he leaves it; anything that seems unfit, not to make his eloquence shine brighter, but ill-adapted to serve as fuel to the flame of war, he leaves untouched. That silence, however, though little creditable to the objector's fairness, at least is valuable in that it forms a reluctant testimony to my Noble Friend's success.

It is said, however, that my Noble Friend made an apology on the subject of the Caroline. Did he? Here is the language of this so-called apology. He is speaking of those who went across the St. Lawrence and cut out the Caroline, and who committed the act of hostility and of invasion of the American territory; and if my Noble Friend made an apology, we must expect to hear him use the language of apology. You will expect to hear him saying,—“We are sorry for it; we will never do so any more; we admit that we are wrong and that you are right; and we beg that you will accept this declaration as an apology for what we have done.” This is the sort of language which, when men talk of an apology, you may expect me to read as the language of my Noble Friend. But what does he really say?—“I might safely put

it to any candid man acquainted with the state of the circumstances, whether the military commander could, on the 24th of December, reasonably expect that he could be relieved by any American authority?" That is to say, when the American authorities found it impossible to restrain their own subjects from the course they were pursuing, we must take the thing into our own hands and act. The Noble Lord goes on,—“How then could the Government, having imposed on them the paramount duty of protecting their own people, be reasonably expected to wait for that which they had no reason to expect?" I really do not know which the most to admire in this passage, my Lords,—the remarkable force, point, and precision of the language, or the dignity of the assertion of the right. “The necessity of self-defence,” continues my Noble Friend, “leaving no option of deliberation, was applicable to this case in as high a degree as to any case in the history of nations.” I need not read further. All the rest of that despatch is to the same effect, and justifies the act on the ground of necessity, using the self-same topic, so offensive at that time to Americans, which my Noble Friend opposite (Duke of Wellington) used in the heat of the controversy—namely, that the American Government was too feeble to restrain its own subjects, and that therefore we must take the law into our own hands. So that it was most justly observed in a work not very prone to take

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the part of America, and which has many sins to answer for in exciting prejudices on both sides,— I mean that able and learned journal, the *Quarterly Review*,—that it is really an instance of kindly feeling on the part of the American Government to take this most plain and spirited assertion of a right as anything like an apology.

But whence did all this dispute arise? It arose — mark this — out of a transaction which ended in reflecting equal honour on the candour and the sense of justice of the American Government, and on the dignified and determined tone of the British negotiator. It arose out of a transaction caused by that very deficiency of authority in the American Government to which the Noble Duke referred at the time, and to which my Noble Friend (Lord Ashburton) refers, in nearly the same terms, in the passage I have just read. It arose out of the case of M'Leod, which was not only declared to be an unlucky one by my Noble Friend, but was also admitted by Mr. Webster to be so, for he says in the very next paper to that from which I have already quoted, that "it is a subject of regret that the release of M'Leod should have been so long delayed." I do not attempt to triumph over the United States because of this admission. I do not assume to look down on the American secretary on account of it. I do not wish to seize hold of this sentence as an apology, and therefore a humiliation of America. But, after all that I have heard said about my

Noble Friend having made an apology, I really must say, that the tone of the passage which I have just read does look to me much more like an apology than anything which is to be found in any part of my Noble Friend's despatches. It is couched in the appointed phraseology of apology, the terms used by men when they feel they have done wrong, and wish to be pardoned by the injured party. But it casts no blame on America or her minister; on the contrary, it does credit to both. It is highly proper, fitting, and becoming that such a passage should there be found, because it shews that those honest Republicans are not prepared to sacrifice truth and justice to diplomatic arts. But see what has been the result. It was necessary for my Noble Friend, on behalf of this country, to endeavour to obtain such an arrangement of the law as would prevent the like evils happening in future. Surely it was no light matter to ask any state to change the fundamental law of its constitution,—to say to them, “Be pleased to alter the form of your government in a material particular,—to add to the power of that Executive, of which you are so jealous that you watch it by every kind of contrivance,—be pleased to give to the Government of that central power, of which all the States of the Union are so especially jealous—as jealous as love of independence and national feelings united can make them,—be pleased to arm the Government with a new, unheard-of, uncon-

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stitutional prerogative, which, till then, had never been enjoyed in the Federal Executive of the States." Surely it was no little matter to ask any power for such a concession ; and for what reason? Why, because the absence of such a prerogative caused inconvenience to the neighbours of that power, and in order that the case of M'Leod might never occur again. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the greatness of such a concession, it was asked by my Noble Friend, and it was entertained; it was honestly, candidly, and liberally received by the American negotiator ; and, ten days before my Noble Friend turned his back upon the country where his negotiation had been so satisfactorily concluded, a law received the assent of the President, altering the constitution, giving the power that was so jealously looked upon, and rendering it impossible, henceforth and for ever, that such a case as M'Leod's could occur any more. I apprehend, therefore, that in that part of the negotiation which related to the Caroline, the success of the negotiator has been triumphant and complete.

The next case is that of the Creole— one of peculiar nicety. If, my Lords, you recollect the affair of the Creole, a year and a half back, and the state of feeling on it both out of doors and in Parliament, you will at once say that at no time has there been any case which appeared more likely to create difficulty, or to encumber the march of negotiation than that of the Creole. I

remember well what took place before my Noble Friend's departure. I had, in common with many Noble Lords, conversations with my Noble Friend on the subject, and I believe it will be readily admitted that no one entertained a doubt how difficult, if not impossible, it would prove to settle that question without consenting to give up something in the way of principle, with regard to the great question of the Slave Trade—aye and something which would be most painful and repugnant to the feelings of this country. It always happens that men forget, or think lightly of difficulties, even of the greatest, after they have been overcome. It is so with us in all matters, from the most trifling to the most important, from the obstacles presented to our progress by a bad road, up to the obstructions in our path when governing a country and administering its affairs. But justice requires, when we are called upon to examine the conduct of those who have guided the state in its course, that we should cast our regards back, and recollect how we felt when the obstacles surrounded us, and beset every step of our path. I am about to carry your Lordships back then to that period, before any one of those difficulties had been overcome. The case is this :— The American coast in the Gulf of Florida lies on the borders of a narrow channel studded with islands, which islands must be neared by almost every vessel engaged in the coasting trade of the Southern States, and since the establishment of steam com-

munication this mode of transport has become still more desirable and preferable to that through the interior, because of the difficulties of the roads. Now, in these vessels the crews are composed of one or two free men and the rest are slaves. The consequence is that this coasting communication, which is almost like a daily communication between parish and parish, cannot be carried on without exposing the owners of those slaves to the difficulty arising out of the principle laid down in the case of Somerset, and now re-asserted in that of the Creole; not to mention that many bands of slaves are constantly carried by their owners coastwise from one state to another, an unavoidable consequence of those great friends of human liberty still pertinaciously clinging to the crime and the curse of Negro Slavery. It was never doubted that the Americans, seeing this difficulty, would call upon us to give them some security against it, so that their Negroes, in coasting from island to island, should not be tempted to run their vessels ashore, in order to avail themselves of that principle by which a Negro, the moment he touches British land, becomes immediately free. The difficulty apprehended was, how we should be able to meet any such demand as this, if it were made. But what has been the result? It appears to me even more gratifying than that in the case of the Caroline. The American Government, as if they saw the situation in which we were placed—the impossibility of our yielding



on that point, and the extreme delicacy of the subject—made no demand of the kind, except that there should be some guard against conspiracies to harbour slaves, or decoy them from their owners; such as we ourselves provide against persons who harbour apprentices against their masters, and such as is provided more or less by all laws. But, on the other hand, a most important gain has been acquired—a most invaluable concession has been made by the American Government. Now, for the first time, I rejoice to say there has been a distinct and unqualified admission by the American Government—by that Government representing not merely the good men of the northern and middle States, where happily slavery does not contaminate the banner of a free republic, but also the Southern States,—they who are as great enemies of Negro Emancipation as ever existed,—for, although under republican institutions, there is nowhere, I am ashamed to say, a more deep-rooted aversion and disgust towards the very name of Negro liberty than exists in the breasts of the free citizens of the slave-holding States of America; nevertheless, a most unqualified admission has been made by the Government which represents those Southern as well as the other States, that the instant a slave, whether American or of any other country, touches a British settlement, that instant his fetters fall off for ever. Then, also, statutory provisions have been stipulated for, and are now in

course of being passed for executing what is called the extradition clause, by which offenders in either country, under strict regulations, shall be mutually delivered up to justice.

And now, my Lords, I approach that which, after all, is the main subject of these negotiations—the Great Boundary Question; but, before I come to that, I must address a few words to your Lordships upon what is called the Right of Search. If your Lordships will look to the despatch of the Noble Earl (Aberdeen) to Mr. Fox, of the 18th of January, 1843, you will find that he there expresses his astonishment that such grievous misrepresentations should have been made, and misapprehensions so industriously circulated on this subject; for that the right of search never did form, and never could have formed, any part of the subject-matter of these negotiations. “The President of the United States must have well-known, said the Noble Earl, that the right of search never formed the subject of discussion during the late negotiations, and that neither had any concession been required by the United States, nor made by Great Britain.” Yet we hear men persisting in the assertion that we have made an abandonment of the right of search. My Noble Friend went there to hear what they had to say on the subject, and, as we had nothing to ask, we had it all our own way. Our right, all the right we claimed, we were in full possession of, and in daily exercise of, consequently we had nothing whatever to propound.

It was for America to ask, which she did not. We did not claim the right of search, in the proper sense of the term, because there had been no Treaty. Without a Treaty there can be no right of search in peace. We search French vessels, but that is by treaty. The Americans never would give up the right,—one of the many evils that have grown out of the state of feeling, which I commenced by describing, and which I was forced to dwell upon at such length, because it appears to me to be the key that will unlock all the difficult passages in this case. We never claimed that right. If a vessel be an American, and is brim full of slaves, though every slave may have been found on board, or may be proved to have been thrown overboard in the chase, though an act of piracy, accompanied by murder as well as pillage, and attended by the most grievous infliction of cruelty, has been committed each time a poor Negro was carried on board in irons, yet we never pretended that in a such a case we had a right to search that vessel, and ascertain whether it were a slave trader or not, or, even if it were admitted to be a slave trader, we admit the right of the Americans to carry slaves, as far as our authority is concerned. They are answerable to their own Government, and not to us, for breaking their own laws, and we do not claim any right to stop or search a really American vessel, even although it may be caught *in flagranti delicto*, in the actual and audacious commission of

piracy or murder. Nor are the right of search and the right of visit two different rights. No such thing. "Visit" is the French word, and "search" is the English. All that we have to do is to make certain that the ship is American, and then all right to search or to detain ceases at once. But, on the other hand, no person has a right to hoist two-penny worth of flag and call it the American flag, and by the magic of the name of that flag keep us out of a slave-ship which we know is not American, or any thing like American. Where the case is one of such pregnant suspicion that there can be no reasonable doubt of the American flag being fraudulently assumed—of the whole being as well a foul fraud on America as on ourselves—in that case our right to ascertain the truth is not done away with; but the fact is, that such cases are not at all included in the proposition on which the supposed right of search is based, because they are not American ships. The law is, the law of Nations, that without a treaty, we have no right to search an *American* ship for slaves any more than for any thing else — that we have no right to stop an *American* ship on the sea—that an *American* ship may, for anything that concerns us, trade in slaves as much and as foully as she pleases. But it is not the law, it is neither the law of nations, nor of common sense, that any vessel may trade in slaves, and commit all crimes, and shelter all felons, by hoisting an American flag, and that the sight of

that flag is to turn away all our cruizers, though they may know that the ship is wholly manned, and owned, and fitted out, by British subjects. Let the objectors, if any there be in America, make the case their own. Suppose a murder committed in America,—I put it in America, for if we have no right to search American guilty vessels, they have no right to enter English guilty vessels—and, by their own argument, if our flag is hoisted to cover that which is not English, they have not any right to go aboard a vessel fraudulently using our flag, and make search, any more than they say we have to go on board an English ship with a false American flag;—suppose a crime of great enormity—a murder of a most cruel stamp, of the utmost blood-thirstiness, was committed at New York, and the perpetrators were to go on board an American ship, which should put out to sea before the police could overtake the felons, and hoist the British ensign, lying off half a mile or a mile from the coast—according to the argument—I am astonished, I am petrified to find that such an argument should be repeated by persons writing on the law of nations, and by that profound jurist, General Cass;—according to their argument, if argument such vile trash may be called, out of pure courtesy to the nation of those who use it to the degradation of that nation—according to their argument, the reasoning of those who can no more draw an inference than a Pyramid, the murderers

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of New York might set the law of the country at defiance, because the ship they were on board of had an English flag, and no one had a right to visit her to ascertain whether she was English or not. That, however, is not the argument of Mr. Webster, or of my friend Mr. Everett, who most worthily represents his country here, and who, whilst he is most ready to maintain the honour of his own nation, feels the most amicable sentiments towards the country in which he is resident. Nor is this the argument of Mr. Stevenson, or of any man but those who shew that they are dealing with subjects of which they are not competent to comprehend even the very rudiments; these able and well informed men never said that their own flag was to cover piracy, because used by fraud.

Oh, but it is said, we are not to look at the text of the treaty; we are to look at the commentary upon the text contained in President Tyler's message. My Lords, I wish to speak with respect of the chief magistrate of the United States, although he was not chosen to be the chief magistrate—he was chosen as the second magistrate, as Vice-President, and by the death of the real object of popular choice, he succeeded accidentally to the chief magistracy. I speak with respect of him in his accidental office of chief magistrate. It is the practice in America, from a great confidence in human life, to choose a person as Vice-President, not with reference to any prospect he

may have of succeeding to the chief magistracy—a person, whom, for chief magistrate, the people never would have thought of choosing. Nevertheless, I speak with respect of President Tyler, as he is a person chosen by the citizens of the United States to fill an office which gave him a chance of becoming President. And yet I confess, I believe that, as an honest republican, the head of a popular Government, he would not object to my giving a fair and candid opinion, that there are some parts of his conduct which I do not approve of, and which I do not at all comprehend. The electioneering system of America seems to me to make the whole time one perpetual canvass from beginning to end of each Presidency, and just in proportion as the period of election approaches does the feeling of political animosity become more exasperated, and all the arts of canvassing become, as it were, more rifully quickened into life. Now the message of President Tyler has been by many viewed as an address, principally on the subject of his own election, to the Southern States of the Union, to which he belongs, or at all events where he has great hopes of success; men have looked at the whole matter as a canvass of the Slave States in the President's message. Certainly, I cannot deny that a very curious gloss is put upon the articles of the Treaty, which makes it appear that we have given up something we never dreamed of, and about which we never negotiated for a moment.

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Those who say nothing of the articles themselves tell us that we have abandoned the right of search, and think they can prove it because President Tyler has said so. I do not say that they are right; I do not say that the President has said so; and I believe he did not mean to say so; if he did, it would have been a canvassing measure, and I am the last man to suppose that he would have uttered a false statement as a truth for the purpose of canvassing.

But President Tyler has happily since told us what he did mean in language so plain that he who runs may read. After stating the law as I have laid it down, he says: "And such, I am happy to find, is substantially the doctrine of Great Britain herself, in her most recent official declarations, and even in those now communicated to the house." This was in February. "These declarations," he adds, "may well lead us to doubt whether the apparent difference between the two Governments is not rather one of definition than principle. Not only is the right of search, properly so called, disclaimed by Great Britain, but that of mere visit and inquiry is"—what? Oh, say those who charge my noble friend Lord Ashburton, with truckling, and abandonment, and degradation, and other hard terms with which they fill their mouths, though I verily believe their heads are free from them—oh, that is the only question. Nobody says that the right of search was given up; but the right of visit—



the right of suspicion—the right of ascertaining if a flag is genuine, and a ship really American—that right has been given up. Has it? Why do you say so? Because President Tyler says so. They do not look at the documents and the treaty, but they trust to the American commentators and to President Tyler. But does he say so? “Even that of mere visit and inquiry is”—what? given up? abandoned? sacrificed? departed from?—No such thing—the very contrary “is *asserted*, with qualifications inconsistent with the idea of a perfect right.” Why, who ever said it was a perfect right? Who ever said that there was an unqualified right to visit any vessel, French or any other? Nobody ever heard of it—nobody ever thought of it. That is the very statement of my noble friend opposite (Lord Aberdeen,) and the statement he abides by, and the statement I abide by; “A right which is only to be exercised under such restrictions and precautions and risk, in case of any assignable damage, to be followed by the consequences of a trespass, can scarcely be considered anything more than a privilege asked for, and either conceded or withheld on the usual principles of international comity.” And the President says—“Such, I am happy to find, is substantially the doctrine of Great Britain herself, in her most recent official declarations, and even in those now communicated to the house.” I was curious to look at these documents thus referred to as communicated now, namely 27th Feb.

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1843, because, though I have the President's clear admission in the rest of the paper, this reference to a document puts the matter beyond doubt. Now, then, I shew your Lordships that I have the admission of President Tyler himself that we have not given up, but have asserted the right of visit. This message of the 27th of February, 1843, refers to the note of Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Everett of the 20th of December, 1841, in which the right of search is modified and qualified; but the right of visiting a vessel under a flag used fraudulently is asserted in plain, distinct, and downright terms, from the beginning to the end of the note. This is the document to which the passage refers; consequently the President states that Lord Aberdeen, up to February 27, 1843, holds by and asserts the right of ascertaining the genuine nationality of any ship under an American flag. Then what says Mr. Webster? At one of his first interviews with Lord Ashburton, when the subject was glanced at Mr. Webster cut short all discussion by distinctly and categorically asserting that the question had been set completely at rest by the unanswered and unanswerable statement of my Noble Friend (Lord Aberdeen) to Mr. Stevenson. [The Marquis of Lansdowne asked where this appeared in the papers?] It is not in any dispatch. I have it in the statement of my Noble Friend Lord Ashburton, made in his place as a Peer of Parliament, which I think sufficient to satisfy my mind as to

what Mr. Webster said to him,—that the question had been for ever settled by Lord Aberdeen's despatch to Mr. Stevenson. But though this would clearly have been sufficient, the matter rests not here. Look to No. 5 of the papers last laid before the House, on the motion of my Noble Friend himself (the Marquis of Lansdowne). I find it stated by Lord Aberdeen, in a letter to Mr. Fox, "that he had no intention to renew the discussion upon the subject, which was the less necessary, as the Secretary of State, that is Mr. Webster, had more than once (I said once; I find I understated the case), more than once declared to the British Plenipotentiary, that is Lord Ashburton, that the statements of Lord Aberdeen had been satisfactory." This shews that I have not misstated or misunderstood the information I obtained from my noble friend. It shews that he must have related in his despatches to Lord Aberdeen, the conversations and admissions of Mr. Webster, in the same terms in which he recounted them to your Lordships in his place.

I have had occasion, in dealing with this branch of the question, to notice what has been said of the political character of America. No one will suspect me of any hostile feeling towards the American Government, or of joining in any outcry raised against it; but when I see it confidently stated by General Cass, and stated as a known and admitted fact, that the American Government is beyond all comparison and without any manner of

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doubt by far the freest Government on the face of the earth, I, with the moderation of one speaking as the subject of another Government, with the respect due to all foreign institutions, and with the self-denial which becomes me in comparing them with our own, must be allowed to enter my protest against such a statement. True, there is no monarchy there; true, they have no thralldom either from despotic prince or haughty patrician; but I do venture, and I think I may without offence venture, to express a hope that all is not tyranny which is clothed with a Royal name, and that all is not pride and oppression where nobility exists; that there may be freedom under a Sovereign, and equal rights enjoyed by private individuals under an aristocratical polity; whilst it is barely possible that there may be tyranny and despotism beyond all endurance—that there may be tyrants, not one but many, who may drive a people to desperation, to abject degradation, to self-abasement, where Kings are unknown; that there may be a helpless state of thralldom in a democratic constitution beyond all that nobles can inflict. The worst sort of tyranny is that of a reckless mob, without responsibility, at least in its corporate or aggregate capacity; but I pause on this proposition; for there is a tyranny worsers still, where not even the slender personal responsibility exists which the individuals of a mob feel—that tyranny, the greatest curse of America—the intoler-

able despotism of the anonymous mob, the licentious and slanderous press,—the curse pervading the whole Union, invading the privacy of domestic life, outraging the personal feelings of all ages and both sexes, from whose venomous fangs nothing is sacred, and which alike revels in the destruction of all character and the corruption of all taste. I name it now in the hope which every good American and every true friend of America cherishes, that many years may not pass over our heads before these ruthless and despicable tyrants shall be dethroned and destroyed, if they cannot be curbed, reformed, and reclaimed!

I now proceed to the last point, but in some respects the most important of all,—the Boundary Question. We have been told that the cessions we have made “have fixed a stain upon the honour of the country, which it would be difficult to parallel in the whole annals of diplomacy.” Here I have no *locus standi*, if there be the least foundation for the charge; but if I repel it and, without retaliation— if I shew that there is no colour or foundation for it, without at all recriminating on those who make the assault—then I think the stain will rest, not upon the honour of this country, or of the negotiator, or of his instructors, who are attacked, but somewhere else, which I leave this House to divine. The Boundary Question was a question of compromise, not of strict right. Then, what is meant by the magnificent expressions about a stain on the honour of

the country, if it was no question of right, but only a matter of arrangement? If, in such a case, I should be of opinion that a man got less than another thought he was entitled to, could it be said that there was a stain upon his honour? But I will shew that nothing was given up at all. In 1794, the negotiations were referred to arbitration, by two commissioners on each side, with power to choose an umpire by lot, and the lot fell on an American, and by these arbitrators the head of the St. Croix was determined to be the commencement of the American line, which thus included the whole of St. John's river. Now, in the American Treaty of 1783, the language is to be considered, though there is a certain map on which I have a word to say. But, if in conveying a certain estate, there is a description and also a plan, the plan is only resorted to in case of ambiguity of the words: if the description is one way and the plan another, the plan goes for nothing. Now the description is this:—"A ridge which divides the waters which flow into the St. Lawrence, from the waters which flow into the Atlantic." If the American line is followed—if the Bay of Fundy is in the Atlantic, then the description of the ridge is completely answered by the American line; but by no conceivable supposition can the ridge be our boundary line; there is no ridge within 200 miles of our boundary, dividing the waters of the Atlantic on the one hand, and those of the St. Lawrence on the other: there-

fore, by possibility their line may be right, but by no possibility can ours be right. Now, the matter was referred to the King of Holland, and he made what the Americans call the Dutch line, which kept the Americans very near the coast of the St. Lawrence. Did we object to this reference? Did we fly off? Did those who now object to what Lord Ashburton has done shudder at what the King of Holland proposed? Did they exclaim, "What, give up 500,000 acres of bad land? God forbid!" Did they shrink at the Americans being so near the coast of the St. Lawrence? Did they wring their hands in despair that we got no more? On the contrary, they accepted the Dutch line; they pressed it urgently upon America for three or four years, and America refused it. There were two great objects, two great points we were throughout anxious to gain,—the keeping away the Americans from the St. Lawrence, and the keeping open the communication between Canada and the coast of that river. The Dutch line gives us the latter object, but not the former. Nevertheless, we adopted and pressed that line on America.

Compare now what Lord Ashburton has done with the Dutch line; and first of all, to estimate the difficulties he had to encounter, look at his situation with reference to this Boundary question. The inhabitants of Maine, of all the people of the United States, are most affected by this question. I believe that they proposed to themselves

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that there should be no treaty on the subject. I believe that was their desire. But I know that they appointed four deputies, and Massachusetts, the state next to Maine most desirous there should be no treaty made, appointed three, to attend the negotiation. They were required to make no concessions ; and that they might be more sure to render the treaty utterly impossible, each of the seven negotiators had an absolute veto upon the whole proceeding at every stage. A *liberum veto*, that famous expedient for neutrality, for preventing all action, for what Americans would term *nullification*, was conferred on each of the seven commissioners with whom my Lord Ashburton had to treat. Such were some of the difficulties with which he had to deal. How did he steer his way? You would say it was utterly impossible he should get a line half so good as the Dutch line—a line of which we were so fond that it was deemed a victory—which was cheerfully adopted by us and pressed upon America, and we were greatly disappointed that it was not accepted. You would naturally suppose that Lord Ashburton, whose difficulties were very much increased by the state of the negotiation, he having succeeded in four points out of the five, which rendered it more difficult to succeed in the fifth, especially when there were parties armed with a veto from Maine and Massachusetts for the express purpose of preventing his success. You naturally expect, therefore, that he would have got anything rather



than the Dutch line. He must give up something, and something considerable, to obtain that line. But what if he gave up very little of any value? What, if the price he paid for obtaining a good line was nothing very material? The Dutch line was manifestly no longer to be hoped for; a worse line was inevitably our fate. What, if the line we obtained through Lord Ashburton, was not so materially worse than the Dutch line as might justly and naturally have been expected?—What, if it was not worse at all? What, if he got the Dutch line itself?—Would that be no success in negotiation? Would that be no praise to a negotiator, so skilfully and judiciously selected?—no praise due to the good instructions he was armed with?—no praise to the ability and firmness with which he executed them?—But what if he got a line a great deal better than the Dutch line? The Dutch is as far inferior to the line which Lord Ashburton has got, as the Dutch line is better than the line we had any title to expect; and while it keeps open the communication—one of the points in view—it removes the Americans much further from the St. Lawrence than the Dutch line did, which was the other great object.

Such is the state of the case. I need not go further; nevertheless, I am compelled to take notice of another circumstance, because it is incumbent upon me, from the singularity of the matters attending it—from the peculiarity of the discovery—from the charges that have been grounded on it of neg-

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lect against us, and of the suppression of truth against my excellent friend Mr. Webster; but which derives in my eyes an additional interest from the name with which it is connected, of one of the greatest philosophers and philanthropists and statesmen by whom either England or America, fruitful in all such produce, ever was before honoured or adorned — I mean the illustrious name of Franklin. We find that, at this extraordinary moment, in a singular place, and under circumstances of no little suspicion, a map or plan has been produced, said to contain Dr. Franklin's sketching, in red ink, of what he held to be the boundary line of Mr. Oswald's treaty; and it is said, that when you examine that line it turns out to be coincident with the British line; whence an argument is said to arise—that we have been defrauded out of a few thousand acres of land, which this map would have given us, and which the Americans must have conceded, because Doctor Franklin, their own negotiator, had drawn it against them and for us in the year 1783. Upon that point I would first make this remark;—it is a very singular fact that my excellent friend, Lord Granville, after searching in the archives of the Foreign-office in Paris, could not find this map; and that there is no trace of its history. Well, then, after a minute being made in the office that there was no such plan; in a letter from Count de Vergennes to Dr. Franklin, or ra-

ther in a letter from Dr. Franklin to Count de Vergennes, in answer to one from him, the Count's letter not being found up to this hour, Dr. Franklin speaks of a map, "in which," he says, "I have traced what I take to be the line in Mr. Oswald's treaty." It is very odd that this could not be discovered at all till a long time after the search for it, and that there is nothing whatever to connect the map with that letter. There is no evidence which they would have been able to produce in any court of justice to shew that this is the map to which Dr. Franklin's letter refers. The map could never have been let into any such case at all. They find the letter in one place, and at one time; and at a different time, and in a different place, they find the map; but whether that is the map referred to in the letter of Dr. Franklin or not they cannot tell. Dr. Franklin's name does not appear upon it; nor is there anything in the slightest degree calculated to connect it with Dr. Franklin; and it is a map of very small dimensions, a few inches square. My first remark upon this is, that under the suspicious circumstances and mysterious nature of its appearance, and the want of evidence to connect it with the letter, it is by no means upon such a document that a great matter like this can be settled: it is by no means upon such evidence as that, so doubtful, and unexplained, and surrounded with so many suspicions, that it would be safe for nations to suffer that the success of their negotia-

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tions should depend. But the map does not tally with the description given? Suppose you had an account in writing, that the Thames, as is the fact, forms the boundary of the counties of Surrey and Middlesex; and suppose you found a map, or chart, or plan connected with that description, on which a red line through Piccadilly was drawn as the boundary—I should not take it; I should go down to the river; because the red line is only to be regarded if the words do not speak for themselves, or the language is ambiguous; and the same is the case here, more or less.

A great charge against Mr. Webster is, that he suppressed the map of Dr. Franklin in the course of the negotiation; and this suppression has been said to savour of bad faith. I deny it. I deny that a negotiator, in carrying on a controversy, as representing his own country, with a foreign country, is bound to disclose to the other party whatever he may know that tells against his own country and for the opposite party. I deny that he is so bound, any more than an advocate is bound to tell the Court all that he deems to make against his own client and for his adversary. My noble friend Lord Ashburton has been objected to—my noble friend opposite has been blamed for selecting him—because he is not a regular bred diplomatist, because he is not acquainted with diplomatic lore, because he is a plain unlettered man as regards diplomatic affairs, and because he had

only the guide of common honesty and common sense, great experience of men, great general knowledge, a thorough acquaintance with the interests of his own country and of the country he was sent to, for his guide in the matters he was to negotiate. But I believe my Noble Friend has yet to learn this one lesson,—that it is the duty of experienced diplomatists, of regular bred politicians, of those who have grown grey in the mystery of negotiation and the art of statescraft, that when you are sent to represent a country, and to get the best terms you can for it, to lower the terms of the opposite party, and to exalt the terms of your own, as far as may be,—you ought first of all to disclose all the weaknesses of your own case—that your duty to your country is something, but that your duty is first to the opposite party, and that you are bound to tell every thing that makes for that adverse party. That is your duty; that is one of those arts of diplomacy which have lain concealed until the present year, 1843,—one of those principles of statesmanship which it remained for the 6th of Victoria to produce and promulgate, but which were assuredly not quite understood by that old French statesman, albeit trained in the diplomatic school, who said that language had been conferred upon men by Providence for the purpose of concealing their thoughts. This was a lesson he had yet to learn, this regular bred diplomatist,—this practised negotiator. He certainly could not have thought

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that it was his duty to practise a window in his bosom, and let every one see what passed in his mind. But it was the duty, it seems, of my Noble Friend to tell all, and it was equally the reciprocal duty of Mr. Webster to do the same. It was my Noble Friend's duty to disclose all that he had found out against the negotiation he went to conduct. That was the new art, the new mystery, the new discovery of 1843; but I find my honourable friend, Mr. Webster, has great authority, and that even if he were wrong, he errs in excellent good company. It does so happen that there was a map published by the King's geographer in this country in the reign of his Majesty George III.; and here I could appeal to an illustrious Duke whom I now see, whether that monarch was not as little likely to err from any fulness of attachment towards America, as any one of his faithful subjects? ("Hear, hear," from the Duke of Cambridge)—because he well knows that there was no one thing which his revered parent had so much at heart as the separation from America, and there was nothing he deplored so much as that separation having taken place. The King's geographer, Mr. Faden, published his map in 1783, which contains, not the British, but the American line. Why did not my Noble Friend take over a copy of that map? My Noble Friend opposite (Lord Aberdeen) is a candid man; he is an experienced diplomatist, both abroad and at home; he is not unlettered, but thoroughly

conversant in all the crafts of diplomacy and statesmanship. Why did he conceal this map? We have a right to complain of that; and I, on the part of America, complain of that. You ought to have sent out the map of Mr. Faden, and said, "This is George the Third's map." But it never occurred to my Noble Friend to do so. Then, two years after Mr. Faden published that map, another was published, and that took the British line. This, however, came out after the boundary had become matter of controversy, *post litem motam*. But, at all events, my Noble Friend had to contend with the force of the argument against Mr. Webster, and America had a right to the benefit of both maps. My Noble Friend opposite never sent it over, and nobody ever blamed him for it. But that was not all. What, if there was another map containing the American line, and never corrected at all by any subsequent chart coming from the same custody. And what if that map came out of the custody of a person high in office in this country—nay, what if it came out of the custody of the highest functionary of all,—of George III. himself? I know that map—I know a map which I can trace to the custody of George III., and on which there is the American line and not the English line, and upon which there is a note, that from the handwriting, as it has been described to me, makes me think it was the note of George III. himself: "This is the line of Mr. Oswald's treaty in 1783,"

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written three or four times upon the face of it. Now, suppose this should occur—I do not know that it has happened—but it may occur to a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,—either to my Noble Friend or Lord Palmerston, who, I understand by common report, takes a great interest in the question; and though he may not altogether approve of the treaty, he may peradventure envy the success which attended it, for it was a success which did not attend any of his own American negotiations. But it is possible that my Noble Friend or Lord Palmerston may have discovered that there was this map, because George the Third's library, by the munificence of Geo. IV. was given to the British Museum, and this map must have been there; but it is a curious circumstance that it is no longer there. I suppose it must have been taken out of the British Museum for the purpose of being sent over to my Noble Friend in America; and, that according to the new doctrines of diplomacy, he was bound to have used it when there, in order to shew that he had no case—that he had not a leg to stand upon. Why did he not take it over with him? Probably he did not know of its existence. I am told that it is not now in the British Museum, but that it is in the Foreign Office. Probably it was known to exist; but somehow or other that map, which entirely destroys our contention and gives all to the Americans, has been removed from the British Museum, and is now to be found at the Foreign Office. Explain



it as you will, that is the simple fact, that this important map was removed from the Museum to the Office, and not in the time of my Noble Friend (Lord Aberdeen).

Now one word as to the ignorance and inefficiency of Lord Ashburton. I am aware that there was a plan proposed in 1837, by very experienced diplomatists, for the settlement of this question; and what do you think they proposed as a rational practical expedient? A mediator was necessary, a reference was necessary, and an arbitration was necessary. The reference to the King of Holland had failed, his award had met with the refusal of America; therefore, they said there must be a new reference, and there must be a new mediator. Let us try this plan, said they. One king does not do, let us appoint three; and so, on the 6th of January, I suppose, which our French neighbours call the day of the Three Kings, but which we call Twelfth-day, they draw for three kings, and this was the result; this was the plan of diplomatists of experience, of regular bred statesmen, of men grown old in the service of the Foreign-office, of men really at the head of all diplomatic craft; this was their consummate tactic for practically settling a difficult question. They said appoint three kings; and what then? Did they add, Let these three kings arbitrate? Oh no, no such plan! It was too much akin to common sense to let those you appointed arbitrators, arbitrate. That was not their plan; they meant nothing so plain

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and so vulgar as that; but they said: "Let us appoint three kings, and let them have a commission to do"—what? To settle the dispute? The kings had a royal road to truth, though there is no royal road to geometry. They had a royal road to an award, which a common arbitrator did not appear to have; but the three kings, truly mailed and fenced in with their own peculiar dignity, they had a road all to themselves in the air, and, therefore, they had nothing to do with arbitrating. They were chosen for that, but they were to do nothing of the kind. What had they then to do? To choose philosophers, men of science, and to send those men of science to examine the boundary—and report. Behold the result of diplomatic experience — of long acquaintance with the forms of office; it is an accomplishment to which my Noble Friend never aspired, even in his dreams of arbitration. I know that once upon a time, by a departure from professional arbitrators, very short work was made of a long suit, which, as my Noble and Learned Friend on the wool-pack knows, had lasted some eight or nine years in the Court of Chancery, and when some of the parties entitled to the property were starving, but that we didn't mind. The suit might have lasted for the natural lives of all the parties, and of the counsel too. Some of the parties were in the workhouse, but they got tired of this; the counsel did not get tired of it at all, nor possibly even the solicitors; but the

judge got tired of it, and the parties got tired of it, and so the judge recommended a reference, and the parties acceded to it, and it was about the only reference in equity that has ever been final. The four years that I was there, there was not a single reference. There was only one in my Noble Friend's time, and it ended in the cause coming back to him again; but in this case the reference was effectual. Now, as they said to the Foreign-office upon the present question, "Why send a man who is not a regular bred diplomatist?" so was it said in this particular case, "Why not take a lawyer—it is shocking, it is indecent not to do so." But the practitioners did let go the carcass, or what little remained of it; it was not much; but the whole cause was referred to my excellent friend Mr. John Smith, and to this very Lord Ashburton. And what was the result? That in less than a week—in less I believe than three days—the whole matter was settled; an entire division of the property took place, there was an end of the suit, and the bill was dismissed. The whole of the money was divided amongst the parties, and those who were in the workhouse were released, and in the enjoyment of their own property. It was a most shocking event, because it took the property out of the hands of those who were its natural owners—I mean the lawyers—and vested it in the hands of those who were intruders, being those to whom it belonged, and who had so long been perishing for want of it.

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And I hope your Lordships will excuse my recounting this anecdote, though a professional one, as it may perhaps a little enliven the dry details into which I am obliged to enter ; but I mention it also to let you know that a man who was not bred a diplomatist, who was not an experienced statesman, might be selected as an arbitrator, and might adjust a most difficult question ; as the same person not bred a lawyer had successfully arbitrated an endless equity suit.

I come now to that part of the question which has reference to the giving up of the Boundary of Madawaska. That is, in fact, the gist of the charge against my noble friend Lord Ashburton. I will state what the Madawaska is. It is a small piece of territory through which the St. John's river runs ; and the insult and dishonour is said to be because British subjects inhabited it, and that we gave up a part inhabited by British people. (" No, no. ") I mean French people from Canada, or from Nova Scotia ; but they were British subjects. The truth is this— In 1763, when the illustrious achievements of our arms at Quebec under Wolfe had conquered Canada, and we had taken possession of Nova Scotia, a number of refugees, disliking our dominion—that is the fact—disliking our dominion, and annoyed by our conquest, left our territory, and voluntarily took refuge in the Madawaska district. I do not think we were very much bound to go out of our way to consider them, and

to run the risk of throwing up our negotiation on their account. But then it is said we have given up and have abandoned this new territory for no object. But what if those people who make these objections did a great deal more to abandon Madawaska than my Noble Friend ever dreamt of doing? For my Noble Friend kept a large portion, and three fourths of the people, and they gave up the whole. Upon the disputed ground a fort, Fort James, was erected by the Americans within the last ten years, while the objectors to this treaty were in the Foreign-office; and yet no step was taken to prevent that act of sovereignty. I suppose no apprenticeship of ten years at the Foreign-office is necessary to make one know that erecting a fort upon any ground was pretty good evidence of a claim of sovereignty over that ground. That fort was erected,—there was no attempt to take it, and that fort was erected on the very spot where we had before arrested a citizen of America named Baker; and for what? For making a seditious movement to claim that very territory on behalf of America. Therefore our allowing the fort to be erected was a great deal worse than if we had allowed it without claim or remonstrance. Mr. Baker was arrested for making a claim. He was given up after being arrested, and the fort was allowed to be erected on the very spot.—Fort Fairfield, another fort, was erected on the same disputed territory, and suffered to re-

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main undisputed and undisturbed.—Then a writ was issued out of Penobscot county for electing American officers in Madawaska. The American officers were arrested for serving and executing that writ; Mr. Livingston remonstrated, and upon his remonstrance the officers were released by the objectors to my Noble Friend Lord Ashburton and my Noble Friend opposite.—Next, a road was made by the Americans through the disputed territory. A remonstrance was offered by us, but the road was not stopped by the objectors. My Lords, there is nothing so degrading—if they talk of dignity, and abandonment, and degradation, and truckling,—as their conduct who do not abandon before remonstrance, and without remonstrance—but choose to remonstrate, and when they are not listened to then abandon.—Last of all a census was taken of the population, another act of sovereignty, and a pretty distinct act—a numbering of their Madawaska subjects by the American Government. My Noble Friend, Lord Ashburton, gave up part of the settlement, and it is said to be an intolerable and unparalleled stain upon our honour. But the very parties who say so allowed that census to be made. The person who was employed to take the census was taken into custody; but on the 5th of August, 1837, he was released by Sir John Harvey, in consequence of positive instructions to that effect from the Foreign Office. The terms in which the demand for his release was couched are sufficiently

remarkable, and are deserving the attention of your Lordships. It says, "A deep violation of our law has been committed on the soil and territory of the United States by the arrest of Creed." Such, my Lords, is the language in which the demand for the release of the person who made the census was couched, and to which Lord Palmerston twice paid implicit obedience, for the same person was again arrested on the 26th of August; but he was again given up upon a remonstrance made by the American authorities, and was never after retaken. If ever men, then, my Lords, had no title to speak of degradation, dishonour, and abandonment of rights in relation to the settlement of Madawaska, surely it is the very men who now so complain of and so vituperate the conduct of my Noble Friend—the men who had long ago suffered five several acts of sovereignty to be done on the spot—had always tried to prevent or to punish them, and had always been frustrated in their attempts—had always yielded when resisted and beaten.

And now, my Lords, I come to the last of these charges which have been showered upon my Noble Friend, and it applies rather to my Noble Friend himself than to those who commissioned him. My Noble Friend's tone, it seems, was too mild; they call it "a truckling, a cunning, a wheedling, "and an undignified tone." My Lords, I am here to deny it, but I feel embarrassed with the nature of such a charge. Hitherto I have had to deal

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with men's actions—with their course of conduct while struggling for the interests of their country, or for the interests of humanity, or, as the objectors alleged, of my Noble Friend, while abandoning and giving away the rights and the interests of both. My Lords, I can understand the acts of a man; I know that they are palpable and may be found fault with—I can perfectly understand that a charge may be brought against a man in respect of deeds done by him—I could deal with such charges and repel them, or if not I might submit; but when I hear a complaint of a tone, of the tone of the language used by an individual, the matter wholly eludes me; it is very difficult to meet, because when you try to grasp it, it vanishes into thin air. My Noble Friend is charged with having compromised the position in which he was placed—with lowering the dignity of that great Crown which he represented. It is said “All his deeds may have been right enough, but look to his words. He has done nothing amiss; he has made no concessions, failed in no attempt, submitted to no dishonour; but observe his tone; scan his words. They are too civil, too humble, too little dignified.” That charge is rested upon the words which are to be found in his despatch of the 21st of June, and to them I entreat your Lordships' particular attention. See what it is that they complain of as “cunning, wheedling, truckling, undignified.” “If the



“part which through a long life I have taken in  
 “public affairs is marked by any particular cha-  
 “racter, it has been by an earnest and persevering  
 “desire to maintain peace and promote harmony  
 “between two countries having a common origin.  
 “. . . . On the accession to power of the present  
 “Ministers, perceiving the same wise and honour-  
 “able spirit to prevail, I could not resist the hope  
 “of being able to serve my country, and, accord-  
 “ingly, at a time of life when no other induce-  
 “ment would have been sufficient to lure me  
 “from that retirement better suited to my feelings,  
 “I have taken upon me the cares of this negoti-  
 “ation.”

I know not whether my Noble Friend is a prac-  
 tised author, and capable of facing the courts  
 critical of the country, any more than that he is  
 a practised diplomatist, and fit to pass muster at  
 the Foreign Office. But I will say, that a more  
 beautiful piece of composition, in the writing of  
 any author, I have never yet seen, than the re-  
 markable passage I have just read. But this  
 language has been attacked as cunning, as  
 truckling, as leading to the humiliation of our  
 country; it has been stigmatized as wheedling  
 and unworthy of a diplomatist. My Lords, who  
 can be so great an authority upon such a question  
 as Mr. Fox? He was not only well versed in all  
 matters of modern and ancient lore, but in Foreign  
 Affairs he was peculiarly so; indeed, he has been

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painted, and most justly painted, by the relative of a Noble Duke opposite, one who knew him well, (Mr. T. Grenville) as the man who, above all other men, was an able and accomplished negotiator. Nay, this very character has been given of him, and his high authority appealed to by those ignorant, those singularly ignorant objectors, whose attacks I am now dealing with. They so ushered in an appeal to his fancied authority. Well, the objectors say, "Good God, what would Mr. Fox have said to such an appointment as that of my Noble Friend? what would Mr. Fox have said to such a cunning, truckling, wheedling mode of carrying on a great negotiation?" Now, my Lords, I cannot take upon myself to say what Mr. Fox would have said. I cannot take it upon myself to speak of him in that fanciful and easy tense, of what a man would have done, or might have done; but I will take upon myself to say, speaking in the past tense,—the tense of the historian, and not of the poet,—I will take it upon myself to say, not what Charles Fox would have done, but what he did; and upon that I rest my case, and the ultimate defence of my Noble Friend.

My Lords, I speak now as a witness of what I am about to lay before you. But I am not the only witness; my lamented friend, Lord Holland, was also present, and I believe the passage will be found in his papers; for I am confident he must have noted down a passage so remarkable, that I

have again and again heard him refer to it. In 1806, when Charles Fox presided over the Foreign Office, the question of furnishing out the embassies arose. Mr. Fox then said, "I will choose my ambassadors only in one way—I will choose them out of Homer." Of course such a reply caused some astonishment, and naturally the question was put to him, "How so?" He said, "When Agamemnon wished to send an embassy to Achilles to promote a treaty of peace with him, he could not find one man combining all the qualities he thought necessary; therefore he chose three—Ajax, Ulysses, and Phœnix. He chose Ajax for his high birth; Ulysses for his great experience and skill in negotiation; and Phœnix, because he was the old master and friend of the man to whom the embassy was sent, and the man for whom Achilles had the greatest regard." Well, then, in choosing his negotiator, my Noble Friend opposite followed the example of Agamemnon. Lord Ashburton had rendered great services to England and America, in promoting a good understanding between them; he was connected with England by birth and affection—As Phœnix stood in an endearing private relation to the chief he was sent to conciliate, so Lord Ashburton had a yet more endearing connexion with the nation he was sent to, having brought from among them the matron who divides with him his cares, who shares his distinguished name, and who will now partake the new illustration which your Lordships are about to shed upon it. In him

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all the three requisites for an embassy were joined, in him there was rank, skill, and above all kindness —kindness mutually prevailing between him and the party with whom he was sent to treat. But then, my Lords, it is said that this was only a speculative opinion of Mr. Fox's; but did he not act upon it? That he most undoubtedly did. He had not been a week in the Foreign Office before a miscreant waited upon him with an offer to assassinate Bonaparte. What was his conduct then? Did he treat the man with sullen scorn, and command him to be cast out of the office because he had offended his dignity? He did no such thing; but he sent him over to M. Talleyrand, who was then the Foreign Minister in France, with a letter; and if any man, or any 100 men, were to swear that in thus sending him over, Mr. Fox had no hope of thereby opening the door for negotiation, that he had no hope of his act of courtesy leading to some reconciliation with France through the Emperor, I would not believe him or them; I would not believe any authority on such a subject, save that of Charles Fox himself, who I full well know never would for an instant of time have put forward so absurd and incredible a pretence. But that was not the end of the truckling and wheedling of Mr. Fox; for negotiations did arise out of these courtesies. One courtesy indeed was repaid with another; for I remember that Mr. Fox received a present of the growth of France, of which I partook, and

which was very acceptable to my illustrious friend for its own intrinsic merits, though still more as a token of reviving good-will among the rulers of France. But, my Lords, Mr. Fox thus opened the door, and the door being opened by this truckling and wheedling system, somebody behoved to enter; and then came the proper time for my illustrious Friend to put the Homeric plan in operation. In the Cabinet of 1806, were men of all the various shades of opinion; the Whigs were there in considerable proportion, the friends of Lord Sidmouth in a smaller proportion, the friends of Mr. Windham in considerable numbers,—men who had been notorious through their lives for a repugnance to France and French notions of liberty; there were also the friends of Lord Grenville, and there was Lord Hastings, who might be characterised as belonging to no party. There was, therefore, no limit to the choice of men in the hands of Mr. Fox; he was not driven to choose a friend of his own by any want of proper materials. Well, according to the doctrine of those who now raise the cry of truckling and wheedling against my Noble Friend, Mr. Fox ought to have chosen for his ambassador a man who all his life had been a violent enemy to Bonaparte, some adherent of Mr. Windham, who had opposed the peace of 1802, and never ceased to vituperate the Consul or the Emperor; some practised diplomatist of Lord Grenville's school, who had rejected the Consul's advances in 1800, on

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his first accession to power. But who was it that he did choose? Why, my late worthy and lamented friend Lord Lauderdale—the very man in all England who was most the friend of France; he was the man selected for that embassy, although during the whole course of his life he had given expression to strong opinions in favour of the French. When the Emperor heard of this nomination he exclaimed, “They have sent me an old Jacobin.” “On m’a envoyé un vieux Jacobin.” Greatly mistaking Lord Lauderdale’s opinions certainly, but right in believing he was partial to France and French principles in those days. My Lords, did any man ever charge Mr. Fox with truckling and wheedling, because of his choice of an ambassador on that occasion? No such thing. Mr. Fox knew that the way to gain his own ends, and to serve his country, was to send over a man who would be favourably received by the party with whom he was to negotiate, and therefore he chose one to whom the French could have no enmity, but for whom they would rather be inclined to feel kindness. If your Lordships want any more instances of the same policy I have one ready, of which I speak from personal knowledge, having been under that truly great man Lord St. Vincent, one of the mission I am about to describe. It was thought expedient to thwart Bonaparte in his attempts upon Portugal, and to prevail upon the Royal Family to leave Europe for the Brazils, an important operation afterwards very ably and successfully performed by my Noble Friend

opposite (Lord Sranford). The battle of Jena, soon after our arrival in the Tagus, suspended for the present our mission ; but how was it composed ? Three Commissioners were sent, and one of those was General Simcoe, a gallant general, no doubt, but wholly inexperienced as a negotiator, and in such a state of health that he died immediately and before the mission was closed. However, he was sent with us on the mere ground that the name he bore was a passport to the hearts of the Portuguese—he was sent because he was the son of the General Simcoe, who took out from England 200,000*l.* towards the relief of the sufferers by the great earthquake in 1761, and whose name was revered in Lisbon. Was that truckling conduct ? No ; it was called, and I think rightly, a wise expedient, and in no manner of way unworthy of or unbecoming a great nation.

My Lords, I have now arrived at the last charge which has been made against my Noble Friend, that at a public meeting he spoke of Boston as being the cradle of American liberty. It is said that such an expression was in bad taste, that it was undignified and unbecoming the representative of England. But, my Lords, it must be remembered that this meeting was held after the negotiations had been terminated, after all had been concluded, and the parties had then met for the purpose of singing, as my Noble Friend (the Duke of Wellington) lately said, a song of triumph upon the happy occasion. It was a public meeting,

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attended by 3,000 persons, and held for the purpose of celebrating the new alliance, the reconciliation between two countries which ought never to be at variance; and what is rather strange, this objection, this charge, is made by Whigs, or a sort of Whig—a Whig not of the first growth, but rather of a light body. It is something strange to hear such as they object to anything said in favour of the cradle of liberty? Wherever the word “liberty” is used I should have thought they would think the sound so sweet as might have reconciled them even to a breach of dignity or decorum; but I find I was mistaken.

My Lords, I am sorry to have detained your Lordships so long, but I am happy to say I have now arrived at the end of this tedious subject, nor shall I think it necessary to trouble you longer on the present occasion. His late Majesty George III. did not think that he stooped from his august position, or adopted a truckling and unbecoming tone when he received Mr. King, the first American Minister, who represented the revolted subjects of the monarch at the court of the sovereign whose allegiance they had thrown off. It was a most delicate meeting for both parties, the more especially as it was well known that the Sovereign had held fast by those provinces until they were wrested from his Royal grasp. Upon that occasion the Sovereign did not think it either cunning, or truckling, or wheedling conduct, to



give the Minister a most courteous reception, and he did so for the purpose of promoting the reconciliation which had just taken place, of cementing the friendship which had just been restored. That was the conduct of the Sovereign—it was worthy of all imitation. He told the American that he was the last man in his dominions to recognize the independence of America ; but he added that there was no man in his dominions who wished better to that independence, or was more anxious for the prosperity of the republic. This noble conduct of the Sovereign was after the cessation of the war ; so also was the speech of Lord Ashburton after the negotiations had been concluded. My Lords, I fervently breathe the same prayer to which my late Sovereign gave expression upon that memorable day. I hope and trust, for the sake of America first, for the sake of England next, for the sake of humanity, of mankind at large, that the establishment of the republic and the prosperity and the happiness of that great people, who are descended from common ancestors with ourselves, may be perpetuated for ever ! I cannot view with indifference that magnificent empire which Englishmen have erected on the Western Ocean ; my heart glows when I reflect that it is from England that America derives all that is valuable in her laws, her institutions, her letters ; but, above all, am I gratified when I reflect that it was from us she inherited that spirit of liberty—religious as well as civil, which has made

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her republic the greatest democratic nation which ever held existence on the face of the earth. Contemplated by itself there is enough to make the heart leap with hope and admiration; but it is necessary in order fully to estimate the blessings which she enjoys, that we compare and contrast her condition with that of other settlements; in other parts of the same continent—in countries enjoying all the gifts of nature, but gifts rendered useless by the want of the great blessings of social existence. Look, my Lords, at the condition of South America, a region blessed by Providence above all others in the boundless resources of nature; with a climate varying from the mild to the torrid through every degree of temperature; with a soil that pours into the lap of man the richest produce in unmeasured profusion, scents the air with every spicy perfume, and for its mineral wealth proverbially surpassing all the earth besides; and peopled by tribes that embrace the industry of the Negro, the swiftness of the Indian, the practised ability of the European; all this abundance has failed to produce the peace that should spring from plenty, has failed to prevent civil broils and perpetual anarchy from becoming the ordinary condition of those boundless regions; and has failed because Spain could not send over to the new world the far greater treasures of good laws, wise institutions—the inestimable treasures of civil and religious freedom. Turn now to the North, where

men, but they were Englishmen, had to struggle with a bad climate and an ungrateful soil. Their numbers, small at first, gradually extended themselves—spreading far and near, till they erected a system of free government, which has proved capable of resisting every tempest; and, finally outrode the revolutionary storm in which so much of the European commonwealth had suffered shipwreck. Wherefore do I draw this contrast: Because I wish to direct the attention of the House to the fact that the Spaniard had not brought out to South America the blessings of a free constitution; therefore did the United States surpass the other portion of the American continent in all that constitutes social and political greatness. If, for a moment, a passing cloud has passed over the American name, by a departure from the high feeling of rigid commercial honour and perfect good faith, I yet entertain no more doubt than I do that I now stand on this floor addressing your Lordships, that the cloud will quickly disappear, and that the free citizens of America will proudly and gloriously resume once more those principles and that practice, from which neither nations nor individuals can safely depart, and on which alone the purity of national honour, with the security of national prosperity, can permanently rest.

My Lords, I have done; I feel that I have trespassed upon your Lordships' indulgence for an unpardonable length of time, but I also feel that I could not

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within a less compass have discharged the important duty which I had voluntarily undertaken. I move you to resolve :—“ That this House doth approve the conduct of the late negotiation with the United States ; doth rejoice in the terms, alike advantageous and honourable to both parties, upon which the Treaty has been concluded ; and doth express its high sense of the ability with which the Lord Ashburton, the Minister sent to treat with the United States, executed his commission, and its satisfaction at the restoration of a good understanding, which it is alike the duty and the interest of both countries to maintain unbroken.”

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After debate, Lord Lansdowne's motion of adjournment was negatived without a division ; and the original resolution was carried all but unanimously—only two peers saying ‘ not content.’ Lord Brougham, in his reply, pronounced a glowing eulogy upon Lord Palmerston's conduct as a colleague, whose unvarying honour and good faith, as well as his great abilities and industry he had known from an experience of four eventful years. He denied that he had the least inclination to underrate his merits, as had erroneously been supposed by a Noble and Learned Friend of his (Lord Campbell) ; and said that he greatly lamented their wide difference of opinion as to the Eastern question, and

was sorry he never could approve his conduct, regarding it, while he was also prepared to deny the construction put upon that conduct in France, as if Lord Palmerston were an enemy to the peace of the two kingdoms; whereas he (Lord Brougham) was persuaded the only difference between them was as to the mode and means, and that his Noble Friend (Lord Palmerston) entirely agreed with him in heartily desiring perpetuity to the peace and friendship of the two countries.

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On Tuesday, 11th April, LORD ASHBURTON appeared in his place, and returned his hearty thanks to the House for the great and unprecedented honour which it had been pleased to confer upon him. He added, that his joy was completed by the terms of the resolution, expressing such good feeling towards America. The Duke of Wellington immediately moved that the Noble Lord's speech be entered on the journals. This motion, having been put by the Lord Chancellor, was carried *nemine dissentiente*.

THE END.

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